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Abstract
We present a theory for why it might be rational for a platform to limit the num-
ber of applications available on it. Our model is based on the observation that
even if users prefer application variety, applications often also exhibit direct net-
work eects. When there are direct network eects, users prefer to consume the
same applications to benet from consumption complementarities. We show that
the combination of preference for variety and consumption complementarities gives
rise to (i) a commons problem (to better satisfy their individual preference for
variety, users have an incentive to consume more applications than the number
that maximizes joint utility); (ii) an equilibrium selection problem (consumption
complementarities often lead to multiple equilibria, which result in dierent utility
levels for the users); and (iii) a coordination problem (lacking perfect foresight, it is
unlikely that users will end up buying the same set of applications). The analysis
shows that the platform can resolve these problems and create value by limiting the
number of applications available. By limiting choice, the platform may create new
equilibria (including the allocation that maximizes users' utility); eliminate equilib-
ria that give lower utility to the users; and reduce the severity of the coordination
problem faced by users.
Classication-JEL: D21, D42, L12, L82, L86
Keywords: platform governance, direct network eects, indirect network eects,
complements, tragedy of the commons, equilibrium selection, coordination, fore-
sight.1 Introduction
Platforms such as computer operating systems (Windows), video game systems (Nin-
tendo), betting exchanges (Betfair), stock exchanges (NYSE), or online gaming sites
(Kaixin001) are institutions that facilitate users' access to applications (dened as oppor-
tunities to fulll users' particular purposes|such as writing documents, playing games,
betting money, or investing capital).1 Among the many governance choices that platforms
make, they determine the number of applications users have access to (e.g., how many
games to oer by a given online gaming platform, how many rms to list by a given stock
exchange, and so on). In this paper, we study the relationship between the number of
applications available on a platform and users' equilibrium utility. We nd that narrow
choice often increases utility and thus creates value.
Platforms are characterized by the presence of indirect network eects: the larger the
number of users means the more rms are willing to join, thus increasing the diversity of
applications available, which in turn raises users' valuation of the platform. For example,
rms' desire to list their shares in the New York Stock Exchange grows with the number
of investors who are expected to trade there; likewise, the larger the number of rms
expected to be listed in the NYSE, the more willing the investors are to invest there
(Cantillon and Yin 2011). Naturally, indirect network eects induced by users' preference
for application variety have played a prominent role in models of platforms, beginning at
least from the pioneering work of Church and Gandal (1992) and Chou and Shy (1996),
and spanning to recent contributions such as Hagiu (2009) and Weyl (2010).
When the value of a platform increases with the number of applications oered, com-
mon wisdom dictates that platforms should provide as many applications as possible.
Indeed, suboptimal exploitation of indirect network eects may have dreadful conse-
quences; superior platforms (better technology, better capitalized, early movers...) may
perish in their competition against second-rate alternatives. Arthur (1990), for example,
describes how Sony lost its battle against JVC in the 1980s whose VHS standard was in-
ferior to Betamax, due largely to lesser movie availability on Sony's standard. Likewise,
it is widely believed that Apple lost its battle against the PC in the late 1980s because
of a dearth of applications. While Microsoft aggressively evangelized independent soft-
ware vendors and provided them with tools and support, Apple based its approach on
in-house development of a small number of applications. By the early 1990s, the number
1Examples of applications include: word processors or spreadsheet programs (in the case of computer
operating systems), games (in video game systems or online gaming sites), sports events (in betting
exchanges), and listed companies (in stock exchanges).
1of applications available for the Mac was a small fraction to that for the PC.
Given the wealth of evidence suggesting that maximizing application variety is a
good idea, it is puzzling that successful platform providers such as Betfair, Nintendo,
or Kaixin001 appear to have actively limited the number of applications available on
their platforms. Betfair provides an electronic platform that allows its customers to back
teams to win in sports such as soccer or horse races, but also to lay odds for others to
bet on. The company began operations in the U.K. in 2000 as a second mover after
Flutter.com. Although Flutter was the rst mover and had better access to capital|
its initial funding was $43.7 million vs. $1 million for Betfair|Betfair won over the
market.2 A key dierence between the two betting exchanges was that while Flutter
would allow users to bet on any event they wished to create (such as next week's weather),
Betfair adamantly restricted the number of events (applications) on which users could
bet. Interestingly, the platform that oered fewer applications ended up faring better.
Similarly, in the late 1980s, Nintendo restricted the number of games that developers
were allowed to release each year for the Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) to ve.
The company also restricted the number of developers who could sell games for the NES.
Nintendo went on to become the dominant player (market share and prot) for the 8-bit
generation.3 Likewise, the leading online social networking site, Kaixin001, provides a
limited number of games for users to engage in (e.g., Parking Cars and Stealing Crops)
when many more could be oered. The site oers the smallest number of social games
among the top social networking sites in China and lags behind its competitors in making
its platform open to third party application developers;4 however, the site has the most
highly active users among them.5 These examples run counter to the conventional wisdom
that when considering application variety in platforms \more is always better."
In this paper, we ask: why might it be rational for a platform to limit the number
of applications when indirect network eects are at play? Our answer is that by limiting
the number of applications the platform may resolve three problems faced by users: a
commons problem, an equilibrium selection problem, and a coordination problem. When
the platform resolves these three problems it creates value because users achieve higher
utility. Thus, our analysis focuses on how limiting the number of available applications
2Betfair acquired Flutter in December 2001 and become the dominant betting exchange in Europe.
See Casadesus-Masanell and Campbell (2008).
3The NES was the leading second-generation (8-bit) game console. Nintendo's global market share
for 8-bit consoles in 1990 was greater than 90%. See Brandenburger (1995).
4http://www.nth-wave.com/wordpress/?p=32985.
5http://www.nytimes.com/external/venturebeat/2010/04/07/07venturebeat-chinas-top-four-social-
networks-renren-kaixi-55248.html.
2aects the value created.6
Our theory is based on the observation that even when platforms enjoy indirect net-
work eects, applications often exhibit direct network eects, i.e., users are better o
using the same applications as other users due to consumption complementarities. For
example, Cantillon and Yin (2010) demonstrate that there are important direct network
eects in derivatives' trading. Specically, as the number of traders for a particular
derivative increases, so does liquidity. Similarly, the richness of gameplay in massively
multiplayer online games (MMOG), such as World of Warcraft, is based on the number
of interactions between players; MMOGs are not fun if played alone. When users have
limited resources (such as nite time to enjoy applications or an income constraint) and
there are many applications available, they must pick and choose which ones to use. If
direct network eects are at play, users are better o by purchasing and consuming the
same limited set of applications.
We show that when users prefer application variety but also benet from consumption
complementarities, three issues may arise. First, the number of applications that maxi-
mizes users' utility may not be part of an equilibrium as each user may nd it optimal to
unilaterally deviate to consume more applications so as to better satisfy her craving for
variety. This is because agents do not internalize the negative externalities they impose
on others: a single user suers almost nothing from the decrease in consumption comple-
mentarities when he increases the number of applications consumed while, in aggregate,
the loss of consumption complementarities is much greater. Second, multiple equilibria
often arise. With the usual assumption that users have perfect foresight, any one of those
equilibria could, in principle, be selected. While some equilibria lead to higher user utility
than others, nothing guarantees that the equilibrium yielding the highest utility will be
selected. Third, if users lack perfect foresight on each others' choices in equilibrium, it is
unlikely that they will end up purchasing and consuming the exact same set of applica-
tions, but such coordination is necessary to fully exploit consumption complementarities.
Our analysis demonstrates that by limiting the choice of applications, the platform
can accomplish three tasks. First, it can create equilibria that did not exist when ap-
plication choice was broad. In particular, the allocation that maximizes users' utility
can be guaranteed to be an equilibrium thus relieving the commons problem. Second,
it can eliminate socially inferior equilibria, eectively resolving the equilibrium selection
6We do not consider how the platform may capture that value through prices (access prices and/or
royalties). We note, however, that generating larger user surplus allows the platform to charge higher
access fees to users. A detailed analysis of platform pricing (i.e., value capture) is beyond the scope of
this paper and left for future research. See Section 4 for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
3problem. Third, it can reduce the severity of the coordination problem faced by users
when they do not know other users' choices in equilibrium. With a smaller choice set, it
is more likely that users will end up purchasing and consuming the same applications and
are thus more likely to enjoy consumption complementarities. We conclude that when
direct and indirect network eects are at play, platforms may create value by limiting
choice.
Contrary to the recent literature on multi-sided platforms (e.g., Rochet and Tirole
2003; Caillaud and Jullien 2001; Armstrong 2006; Hagiu 2009; Casadesus-Masanell and
Ruiz-Aliseda 2009), which for the most part focuses on pricing and developer entry,
we study the behavior of users and consider exogenous application prices. We show,
however, that the three problems faced by users due to concurrent direct and indirect
network eects (i.e., commons, equilibrium selection, and coordination) arise regardless
of the prices of applications.7 The key implication is that the platform cannot induce
users to consume the optimal number of applications by manipulating application prices.
The conventional wisdom why platforms must promote large numbers of applications
is that users' consumption utility increases with the number of applications available (due
to preference for variety). Obviously, larger utility allows the platform to charge higher
access prices. Our results imply, counterintuitively, that when direct and indirect network
eects are at play, the platform will typically be able to charge higher access prices to
users|and thus earn additional prots|if it also restricts the number of applications
available.
1.1 Literature
Our paper contributes to the literature on multi-sided platforms and two-sided markets.
Pioneering work by Spulber (1996, 1999) examines how rms establish markets acting as
intermediaries between buyers and sellers. The platforms that we study also establish
markets as they bring users and developers together. The literature on multi-sided plat-
forms and two-sided markets has continued to ourish on the basis of industry-specic
models. Rochet and Tirole (2003), for example, is inspired by the credit card industry;
Armstrong (2006) captures well the economics of newspapers; and Hagiu (2009) considers
competition between video game systems. General results have been derived by Spulber
(2006) who models centralized and decentralized two-sided markets through network the-
ory. Likewise, Rochet and Tirole (2006) proposes a formal denition of two-sided markets
7In this paper, we limit our attention to environments with symmetric prices of applications, i.e., the
applications are a priori homogeneous, and each is sold at the same price.
4and presents a general framework for the analysis of such markets; and Weyl (2010) de-
velops a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks with weak constraints on the
nature of user heterogeneity.
While most of the literature on platforms has examined issues related to pricing, there
is a new and growing line of work studying platform governance beyond pricing. Hagiu
and Jullien (2011), for example, demonstrates that platforms may have incentives to make
it harder for users to gain access to the other side of the market. Likewise, Caillaud and
Jullien (2003) considers the impact of matching technology on platform competition. Our
paper focuses on one aspect of platform governance that has received little attention thus
far: the eect of limiting the choice of applications on user behavior, and ultimately on
the value created by the platform.
The only two papers we are aware of that are directly related to the question that we
address here are Zhao (2010) and Ha  laburda and Piskorski (2010). Zhao (2010) studies
hardware/software platforms and explores the eects of quantity constraints on product
quality and variety on a monopolistic two-sided platform where quality is uncontractible.
He nds that when users cannot perfectly observe application quality, developers un-
derinvest in quality and the platform can then use quantity restraints to help mitigate
free-riding and increase overall application quality.8 While Zhao (2010) studies the eects
of quantity limitations on the behavior of developers, we study the eects on the behavior
of users. A second point of dierentiation is that while he provides an explanation for why
it may make sense for the platform to limit the number of applications per developer, in
his theory the platform gains nothing from limiting the number of developers. Therefore,
contrary to ours, his theory is silent about the benets of limiting the overall number of
applications oered by the platform.
Ha  laburda and Piskorski (2010) studies dating platforms, an environment with indirect
network eects: men prefer a market with a larger number of women, and women prefer
a market with more men. This paper shows that, nonetheless, users may benet when
dating platforms limit the number of candidates among which to nd a match. This is
because dating platforms limit the number of candidates on both sides. Thus by limiting
choice, platforms also limit competition between agents in the same side. Some agents
prefer a platform with less choice, because it increases the probability that they will nd
a match. The current paper diers from Ha  laburda and Piskorski (2010) in two ways.
First, Ha  laburda and Piskorski (2010) is the best suited for markets with one-to-one
8Hagiu (2011), in turn, studies how a platform can increase the average quality of platform participants
by imposing restrictions on user access|as opposed to limiting the number of applications available.
5matching, like dating or housing markets. The current paper focuses on markets where
users can consume a large number of applications. Moreover, applications are innitely
duplicable: when one user consumes an application, it does not limit the availability
of the same application to other users. Second, our setting lacks the competitive eect
that drives the result in Ha  laburda and Piskorski (2010). To the contrary: as a result of
consumption complementarity, the direct network eect is positive. Users gain if more
users (on the same side of the market) consume the same applications. Thus, users benet
when the platform restricts choice because it helps them take advantage of consumption
complementarities to a fuller extent rather than avoiding competition.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the game with perfect
foresight, solve for equilibria under direct and indirect network eects, and discuss the
utility implications of the platform limiting choice. In Section 3 we recast the model as
one where users have no foresight about other users' choices in equilibrium. In Section 4
we discuss our main modeling choices as well as some extensions to the analysis. Section 5
concludes. Appendix A shows that our results hold for a generalized formulation of the
model. All proofs are in Appendix B.
2 Game with perfect foresight
We consider a platform which brings together developers and users of applications. There
is a set A of available applications and N users. We denote the cardinality of A by A.
We treat N and A as exogenous.
Let xk
a denote user k's consumption of application a. The consumption utility that
user k derives from consuming xk = (xk
1;xk
2;:::;xk
A) applications is given by
u(x
k;fx
lgl6=k) =
X
a2A
 
x
k
a
1=R
R
| {z }
preference for variety
+ 
X
a2A
 
x
k
a
X
l6=k
x
l
a

| {z }
consumption complementarity
;
where   0 captures the strength of consumption complementarity, and 1  R < 2
captures the intensity of the user's preference for variety.9 The larger is , the more the
9Note that when  = 0, preferences are as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Moreover, the analysis is
only interesting for R < 2. For such R, the marginal benet from consuming another application is
positive but decreasing. Conversely, for R  2, the marginal benet from consuming another application
is increasing or constant. Thus, since for p < X a user nds it benecial to consume one application, then
for R  2 she will always nd it benecial to consume all applications. To keep the analysis interesting,
we restrict R < 2.
6users benet from consuming the same applications. Likewise, the larger is R, the more
the users prefer application variety, i.e., consuming a larger number of applications.
Consumption utility u captures both, direct and indirect network eects. Indirect
network eects originate from users' preference for variety: users prefer platforms with
more users because it is more likely that more applications will be developed for that
platform. Therefore, when R is larger, the source of indirect network eects is stronger.
When R = 1, however, users have no preference for variety, and therefore there are no
indirect network eects.
Direct network eects are present when a user's utility from consuming an application
increases with other users' consumption levels of the same application. For example, users
of video games enjoy a given game more if their friends also consume the same game,
as they can discuss strategies to beat the game, their experiences, etc. Direct network
eects are captured by the term   xk
a 
P
l6=k xl
a: user k's enjoyment of her consumption
of application a is larger the more the other users (l 6= k) consume application a. We
let   0. When  = 0, there are no direct network eects and as  increases, direct
network eects become stronger. In summary, user preferences may exhibit direct or
indirect network eects, or both, depending on the value of parameters  and R.
We assume that users have a budget of X units of time to consume applications and
interpret xk
a  0 as the amount of time that user k spends consuming application a.
Thus, if user k consumes a set Qk  A of applications, she must satisfy the time budget
constraint: X 
P
a2Qk xk
a. Each application is sold at an exogenous monetary price p>0,
regardless of how much time users spend consuming it.10 Since the monetary dimension is
dierent from the time dimension, spending p does not detract from the time budget X.
We assume that p is suciently low for users to nd it desirable to purchase and consume
at least one application, i.e., we let p < X. Therefore, it follows that users consume at
least one application, i.e., Qk  1, where Qk denotes the cardinality of Qk.
User k's net utility from consuming xk when price is p is given by
U(x
k;fx
lgl6=k) = u(x
k;fx
lgl6=k)   p 
X
a2A
1(x
k
a); (1)
where 1() is an indicator function taking value 1 when its argument is dierent from
zero.
10As foreshadowed in footnote 7, this analysis focuses on the case where the prices of applications are
symmetric. We leave the analysis of the environment with asymmetric prices for future research. The
results for p = 0 can be found in Appendix B of the working paper version (Casadesus-Masanell and
Ha  laburda 2010).
7Since the focus of our analysis is on the value of limiting choice, we also assume that
absent action by the platform to constrain the set of available applications, the cardinality
of A is large. Specically, we assume that A 
 (R 1)X
p
 1
2 R. We will show (see Remark 2)
this guarantees that there are suciently many dierent applications available for users
to satisfy their preference for variety.
We consider the following two-stage game: In the rst stage, all users decide simul-
taneously which applications to purchase at price p. In the second stage, users decide
simultaneously how to allocate their time budget X across the applications they have pur-
chased. We solve for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies and follow
Katz and Shapiro (1985) in assuming that expectations are fullled in equilibrium.11
Formally, given that user k has already purchased a set of applications Qk, in the
second stage she chooses consumption xk to maximize her own consumption utility u
given the expected consumption of all other N   1 users, xl for l 6= k:
max
xk
a;a2Qk u(x
k;fx
lgl6=k) subject to X 
X
a2Qk
x
k
a: (2)
In the rst stage, users choose the set of applications to purchase, Qk  A, anticipating
their own consumption and that of all other users in the second stage. User k's objective
is to maximize her own net utility U.
We end the description of the model by presenting two denitions that are helpful for
the discussion of equilibria.
Denition 1 (balanced strategy) Let Qk = fajxk
a > 0g be the set of applications
consumed by user k, and let Qk be the cardinality of Qk. We say that user k's strategy is
balanced if xk
a = X
Qk for all a 2 Qk.
Thus, a balanced strategy is one where the user allocates her time budget equally across
all the applications she consumes. Note that balanced strategies are pure strategies and
that for any Qk there is a unique balanced strategy.
Denition 2 (balanced equilibrium) An equilibrium is balanced if all users play bal-
anced strategies.
In this section, we solve the game under the assumption that users have perfect fore-
sight about other users' choices in equilibrium. This is a classic assumption of rational
11As we argue in Section 4, solving for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a two-stage game leads
to the same results as the single-stage formulation, but is technically more convenient.
8beliefs|a part of Nash equilibrium. Later, in Section 3 we relax the perfect foresight
assumption.
In the remainder of this section, we investigate each type of network eect separately
before considering the interplay of both types together. We rst study the model with
direct network eects and nd that users consume one single application so as to take
full advantage of consumption complementarities (Section 2.1). Then, we move on to the
model with pure indirect network eects and nd that users choose to consume a large
number of applications driven by their preference for variety (Section 2.2). Next, we study
the interplay between the two types of network eects and nd that there is a tradeo
between harnessing consumption complementarities and the utility gains from product
variety. In the equilibrium that yields the highest utility to users, they always consume
a smaller number of applications than under pure indirect network eects (Section 2.3).
Finally, we show that the platform can create value by limiting the number of applications
available even if users have perfect foresight about each others' purchase and consumption
decisions (Section 2.4).
2.1 Direct network eects
There are pure direct network eects when users derive utility from consuming the same
applications as other users but not from product variety. Therefore, consumption utility u
exhibits pure direct network eects when R = 1 and  > 0. In this case, user k's net
utility (1) takes the form
UD(x
k;fx
lgl6=k) =
X
a2A
x
k
a + 
X
a2A
 
x
k
a
X
l6=k
x
l
a

  p 
X
a2A
1(x
k
a):
User k's consumption of application a in an equilibrium is denoted by ^ xk
a. Let Qk
D  A
be a set of applications that user k consumes in equilibrium in an environment with pure
direct network eects. Then, the cardinality of Qk
D is Qk
D =
P
a2A 1(^ xk
a). Remark 1
characterizes the equilibria in this case.
Remark 1 When R = 1 and  > 0, in every equilibrium Qk
D = QD for all k and the
number of applications consumed is Qk
D = QD = 1 for all k. There are A equilibria. All
equilibria are balanced and yield the highest possible utility to the users.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 33.
9Because R = 1, users derive no utility from product variety. However, because  > 0,
they derive utility from other users consuming the same applications for longer periods of
time. Indeed, user k's marginal utility of consuming application a is increasing in other
users' aggregate consumption of a,
@ uD(xk;fxlgl6=k)
@xk
a
= 1 +  
X
l6=k
x
l
a :
Therefore, the more other users consume application a, the more user k desires to con-
sume a. Since the same applies to all users, in equilibrium all users consume the same
application. Users could coordinate on any one of the A applications available, since all
users and all applications are homogeneous.
2.2 Indirect network eects
There are pure indirect network eects when users derive utility from product variety but
not from consuming the same applications as other users. Therefore, consumption utility
u exhibits pure indirect network eects when 1 < R < 2 and  = 0. In such a case,
user k's net utility (1) takes the form
UI(x
k;fx
lgl6=k) =
X
a2A
 
x
k
a
1=R
R
  p 
X
a2A
1(x
k
a): (3)
Note that (3) is essentially the same as the setup in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), with two
exceptions. First, the cost of time spent using application a is set in our model to 1 for
all a 2 A. Second, we impose a price p > 0 that users must pay to use an application.12
Remark 2 characterizes the equilibria under pure indirect network eects.
Remark 2 Assume 1 < R < 2 and  = 0. In every equilibrium the number of appli-
cations consumed is Qk
I = QI for each user k, where QI = maxf1;
 (R 1)X
p
 1
2 Rg. All
equilibria are balanced and yield the highest possible utility to the users.13
12More precisely, our cost of time (which we normalize to 1) corresponds to the application prices in
the original Dixit-Stiglitz's formulation. In contrast to Dixit-Stiglitz, we assume that users must pay a
xed price for access to each application she consumes, p > 0. This price is independent of the usage.
For example, when users buy a particular videogame title, they pay for it once regardless of the usage,
then they allocate scarce time to playing the game. In our model, the price of the game is p and the
opportunity cost of time allocated to playing the game is 1.
13There are NA!
QI!(A QI)! pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria and continuum mixed strategy
equilibria.
10Proof. See Appendix B, page 34.
To understand this result, notice that Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) implies that when
 = 0 and p ! 0, the solution to optimization problem (2) is QI ! 1 and ^ xk
a = X
QI !
0. Users derive utility from product variety and nd it optimal to consume as many
applications as possible in equal proportions. The result is driven by the fact that, as
long as R > 1, applications have innite marginal consumption utility around zero,
lim
xk
a!0
@ uI(xk;fxlgl6=k)
@xk
a
= 1;
and that this marginal utility decreases as consumption increases. Therefore, spreading
the time budget evenly across Q + 1 applications yields more utility than spreading the
same time budget across Q applications.
To determine how many applications to purchase, users must compare the additional
benet from consuming an additional application and the price p that they must pay
for that application. Specically, if Q applications are consumed by a user in optimal
consumption schedule, her utility is
 
Q
 
X
Q
 1
RR   pQ = QR 1X   pQ. Therefore, the
marginal benet from increasing Q is (R 1)QR 2X. The marginal cost of an additional
application is p. The number of applications at which the marginal benet and marginal
cost are equal is
 (R 1)X
p
 1
2 R.
As customary in the platforms literature (e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg 2003), we ignore
the integer problem and treat the number of applications Q as a continuous variable. As
indicated on page 7, users consume at least one application. Thus, if
 (R 1)X
p
 1
2 R < 1,
the user consumes one application. That is, the optimal consumption is characterized
by QI = maxf1;
 (R 1)X
p
 1
2 Rg. As we show later, the number of applications consumed
under direct and indirect network eects is never larger than QI. Therefore, to focus on
non-trivial analysis, from now on we assume QI > 1,14 which implies QI =
 (R 1)X
p
 1
2 R.
Let Qk
I  A be the set of applications that user k consumes in equilibrium in an
environment with pure indirect network eects. Remark 2 states that all users consume
the same number of applications in equilibrium, i.e., Qk
I = QI for all k. However, it does
not need to be that users consume the same applications, i.e., it may be that Qk
I 6= Ql
I for
k and l 6= k. This is because users gain no utility from consuming the same applications
as others. Thus, any N subsets of A with cardinality QI constitutes an equilibrium.
14The working paper version (Casadesus-Masanell and Ha  laburda 2010) also considers the case where
QI = 1.
112.3 Interplay between direct and indirect network eects
Now we investigate what happens when users in the platform experience both direct
and indirect network eects so that they derive utility from product variety and from
consuming the same applications as other users. In such a case, 1 < R < 2 and  > 0. Let
Qk
DI  A be a set of applications that user k consumes in equilibrium in an environment
with direct and indirect network eects, and let Qk
DI be the cardinality of Qk
DI. Note
that in the cases of pure direct and of pure indirect network eects, all equilibria could
be uniquelly characterized by the number of applications user k consumes in equilibrium,
i.e., Qk
D = 1 and Qk
I =
 (R 1)X
p
 1
2 R > 1. However, as we show below, when both direct
and indirect network eects are present, multiple values of Qk
DI are possible.
The study of this hybrid specication is substantially more complex than the cases
of pure direct and pure indirect network eects. We will show that there is always a
set of equilibria close to QI, the number of applications that users would choose if only
indirect network eects were at play. And if consumption complementarity is suciently
strong relative to preference for variety, another set of equilibria emerges around con-
suming QD = 1 (the equilibrium number of applications consumed under pure direct
network eects). Specically, under hybrid network eects, equilibria emerge which are
not equilibria under pure network eects of either type. Moreover, possible cardinalities
of the consumption set in an equilibrium depend on the strength of consumption com-
plementarity relative to that of preference for variety. We present the analysis in parts,
beginning with two helpful lemmas.
Lemma 1 Assume that 1 < R < 2 and  > 0. In every balanced equilibrium Qk
DI = QDI
for all k.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 35.
Lemma 2 Assume that 1 < R < 2 and  > 0. If QDI is the cardinality of the consump-
tion set in a balanced equilibrium, then any set of applications QDI  A of cardinality
QDI constitutes a balanced equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 36.
Lemma 1 says that in every balanced equilibrium all users consume the same ap-
plications. It is driven by presence of direct network eects. Lemma 2 says that if
QDI is the number of applications consumed in a particular balanced equilibrium, then
12there are CA
QDI equilibria with the same number of applications consumed. For exam-
ple, if A = f1;2;3;4g, QDI = 2 characterizes six balanced equilibria: QDI1 = f1;2g;
QDI2 = f1;3g; QDI3 = f1;4g; QDI4 = f2;3g; QDI5 = f2;4g; and QDI6 = f3;4g. It is easy
to see that users derive the same utility in all of these equilibria and, thus, we think of
them as equivalent. The lemmas imply that in the case of 1 < R < 2 and  > 0 we may
completely characterize balanced equilibria by simply stating equilibrium cardinalities
QDI. For clarity of exposition, we refer to balanced equilibria by just indicating their
cardinality, QDI.
Suppose that all users play balanced strategies and consume the same set of applica-
tions of cardinality Q. Then, each user's net utility (1) is given by V (Q):
V (Q) = Q
R 1X + 
X2
Q
(N   1)   pQ: (4)
Function V (Q) is helpful in studying balanced equilibria. Not every Q constitutes an
equilibrium. However, Lemma 1 implies that the net utility in every balanced equilibrium
must be given by V (Q).
Figure 1: Shape of V for dierent values of .
(R = 1:7135, A = 30, X = 2, N = 16, p = 0:646.)
Figure 1 illustrates the shape of V for dierent values of . The shape of V is driven
by the weight of consumption complementarity relative to that of preference for variety.
As shown by Remark 1, consumption complementarity and the resulting direct network
eects induce users to consume one application only. Remark 2, however, shows that
preference for variety and the resulting indirect network eects induce users to consume
more applications. The graph in Figure 1 shows that when users have strong preference for
variety compared to consumption complementarity (low  relative to R), indirect network
13eects outweigh direct network eects and the Q that maximizes V is interior. When
preference for variety is weak relative to consumption complementarity direct network
eects outweigh indirect network eects and Q = 1 maximizes V .
Let
b Q = max

1; Q such that
dV
dQ
= 0

:
If V has interior maxima, then b Q is the unique interior maximum. Otherwise, V reaches
its maximum at b Q = 1. As we can see in Figure 1, when  is large, b Q = 1 (cf.  = 0:16 in
the gure). Otherwise, b Q > 1 (other values of  in the gure). The value b Q is important
for the shape of V . Specically, for Q > b Q, V is always decreasing. However, for b Q > 1,
when Q < b Q, V rst decreases and then increases. It is possible for some Q < b Q that
V (Q) > V (b Q). Let Q? be Q < b Q such that V (Q?) = V (b Q), when b Q > 1. (See Figure 2,
below, for an example.)
The following remark states that b Q is lower than QI, the equilibrium number of
applications consumed when there are no direct network eects (as dened in Remark 2).
Remark 3 Assume that 1 < R < 2,  > 0 and QI > 1. Then b Q < QI.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 36.
Intuitively, the presence of direct network eects prompts users to allocate their limited
time budget to fewer applications. Consumption complementarity, due to other users
consuming the same applications, compensates for the loss of application variety. The
fact that we consider QI > 1 guarantees that the comparison between b Q and QI is
nontrivial.15
As noted above, b Q > 1 is the unique interior maximum of V . The following proposition
shows that when b Q > 1, users face a commons problem. Specically, when all users
consume b Q > 1 applications, every user nds it protable to unilaterally deviate upward.
However, when all of them deviate, they receive a lower utility. Notice that b Q > 1 when
preference for variety, R, is large relative to consumption complementarity, .
Proposition 1 (commons problem) Assume that 1 < R < 2 and  > 0. If b Q > 1,
then b Q is not a balanced equilibrium. Specically, for any user k, U(Qk = b Q + ";fQl =
b Qgl6=k) > V (b Q) > V (b Q + ").
15For QI = 1, b Q = QI = 1.
14Proof. See Appendix B, page 37.
The proposition states that when b Q is interior, it cannot be a balanced equilibrium.
This is because there is a protable unbalanced upward deviation, i.e., each user has
incentive to consume more applications. To see this, consider a unilateral balanced devi-
ation to " more applications. The deviator consumes X=(b Q + ") of each application. We
now show that such deviation brings no additional utility. Note that the payo from this
upward deviation under balanced consumption is
UDI(b Q + "jbalanced) =

b Q + "
R 1
X + 
 b Q
X
b Q + "
(N   1)
X

 b Q
  p

b Q + "

;
which is the same as V (b Q + "). Therefore, because V 0(b Q) = 0, V (b Q + ") is maximized
at " = 0. This means that an incremental upward deviation with balanced consumption
from b Q yields 0 benet.
We now argue that an unbalanced deviation is strictly protable. Note that the b Q
applications are also consumed by all other users while the new applications are consumed
by the deviator only. Because of consumption complementarity, the marginal benet
from the b Q applications is larger than that from the applications that only the deviator
consumes. Therefore, shifting some consumption from the additional applications to any
of the b Q applications will lead to higher utility than the balanced deviation. Therefore,
an optimal upward deviation is strictly protable. Just as in the tragedy of the commons,
all users have the same incentives and every user will deviate. When every user chooses
to consume b Q + ", each of them will receive payo V (b Q + "), which is lower than V (b Q).
The following lemma shows that there is a large set of Qs that cannot characterize
balanced equilibria. The result is helpful because it signicantly constrains the set of Qs
that may characterize equilibria.
Lemma 3 Assume that 1 < R < 2 and  > 0. Then for any Q such that maxf1;Q?g 
Q < b Q or Q > QI, Q cannot characterize a balanced equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 37.
Figure 2 illustrates Lemma 3.
To understand this result, consider rst Q > QI. Given that all other users consume
Q applications, any user has incentive to deviate downward to QI. The utility for user k
15Figure 2: Intervals of Q that cannot be an equilibrium as described in Lemma 3.
from deviating to Qk < Q is
UDI(Q
k  Q) =
 
Q
kR 1
X +  
  Q
k X
 
  Qk(N   1)
X
Q
| {z }
consumption complementarity
 pQ
k : (5)
Note that the consumption complementarity term is independent of Qk. Since she con-
sumes Qk < Q, the deviator consumes only applications also consumed by the other
users. Each of those applications is consumed by all other users at the level of (N  1)X
Q.
The deviator divides her time budget X amongst the Qk applications that she consumes,
Qk  X
Qk. Therefore, the benet of the direct network eect is constant, no matter what
Qk < Q the deviator chooses. However, the net benet of variety (Qk)R 1X   pQk is
maximized at QI which is lower than Q. As a consequence, the deviator would want
to deviate to QI. We conclude that Q > QI may not be an equilibrium. Intuitively,
consuming more than QI applications leads to too much application variety for the price.
Moreover, if it had an eect, consumption complementarity would push users to consume
fewer applications also.
For Q 2 [maxf1;Q?g; b Q), however, there is a protable deviation upward. In what
follows, we impose that the deviator balances her time budget across all the applications
that she consumes. Even though this is not the optimal deviation, we show that it is a
protable deviation (and therefore, the optimal deviation is also protable). Given that
all other users consume Q applications in a balanced way, the utility of the deviator from
a balanced consumption of Qk applications is:
UDI(Q
k  Q) =
 
Q
kR 1
X +    Q
X
Qk(N   1)
X
  Q | {z }
consumption complementarity
 pQ
k : (6)
16Note that UDI(Qk  Q) is the same function of Qk as V in equation (4) which has a local
maximum at b Q > Q. Moreover, for all Q 2 [maxf1;Q?g; b Q), UDI(b Q > Q) > UDI(Q).
Thus, for all those values of Q, there is a protable upward deviation. We conclude that
Q 2 [maxf1;Q?g; b Q) may not be an equilibrium.
Intuitively, consuming more applications satises the deviator's preference for variety
to a greater extent. However, consuming less of each application consumed by other users
means that the utility from consumption complementarity is lower. When Q 2 [Q?; b Q]
the tradeo is resolved in favor of consuming more applications.
Note that for Q 2 [1;Q?] and Q 2 [b Q;QI] the same tradeo is at play. However, it
is possible that the tradeo is resolved in favor of consumption complementarity which
means that it is not worth it for users to deviate upward. In combination with Lemma 4,
this observation implies that equilibria are possible in the intervals Q 2 [1;Q?] and
Q 2 [b Q;QI]. Lemmas 5 and 6 show that multiple equilibria exist in these intervals. We
show that there are two aspects to this multiplicity. First, as described in Lemma 2, for
any given cardinality QDI there may exist multiple sets QDI|each constituting a separate
equilibrium. Second, there may exist many dierent values of QDI that characterize
equilibria. The former type of multiplicity is of no consequence to user utility while the
latter has important utility implications. Thus, we focus only on the second type of
multiplicity in our analysis.
The following lemma assures that so long as Q  QI, it is never benecial for user k to
deviate to a strategy with a lower number of applications. Thus, in searching for balanced
equilibria we need to focus only on deviations to a larger number of applications.
Lemma 4 Assume that 1 < R < 2 and  > 0. If all users play balanced strategy Q with
cardinality Q  QI, then any unilateral deviation by user k to any other strategy with
Qk < Q leads to lower utility for player k.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 38.
To understand this result, suppose that all users are consuming Q  QI and consider
a deviation to Qk < Q. We do not restrict the user to deviate to a balanced strategy with
Qk. However, from among all possible deviations to Qk < Q, a balanced consumption of
Qk applications from the set Q is the most protable. Thus, the utility from the most
17protable deviation to Qk is given by formula (5):
UDI(Q
k  Q) =
 
Q
kR 1
X +  
  Q
k X
 
  Qk(N   1)
X
Q
| {z }
consumption complementarity
 pQ
k :
Note that UDI(Qk  Q) is increasing for all Qk  QI and therefore it is maximized at
Qk = Q. Thus, if Q  QI, there is no incentive to deviate downward.
Intuitively, consuming fewer applications satises user k's preference for variety to a
lesser extent. At the same time, there is no benet from consumption complementarity.
The reason is that each of the applications used by the deviator are consumed by all other
users at the level of (N  1)X
Q. Therefore, it is optimal to the deviator to divide her time
budget X equally among the Qk applications that she consumes, whereby she consumes
X
Qk of each. Since Qk  X
Qk = X, the benet of the direct network eect is constant no
matter what Qk the deviator chooses.
We use Lemma 4 to prove the result in Lemma 5. Lemma 5 states that there al-
ways exists a balanced equilibrium where all users consume QI applications and that Qs
close but lower than QI also characterize equilibria. Together with Lemma 3, Lemma 5
indicates that QI is the equilibrium with the largest number of applications consumed.
Lemma 5 When 1 < R < 2 and  > 0, there always exist balanced equilibria with
QDI = QI, where QI =

(R 1)X
p
 1
2 R
> 1. Furthermore, there exists Qo < QI such that
any Q 2 [Qo;QI] characterizes balanced equilibria, i.e., Q = QDI.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 39.
Figure 3a illustrates the result in Lemma 5. This result means that so long as users
exhibit preference for variety, no matter how small, there are balanced equilibria with the
same number of applications, QI, that users would choose to consume if there were no
direct network eects.
To understand why QI is an equilibrium, by Lemma 4 we need only consider devia-
tions upward. By the same argument to that following equation (6), a deviation upward
(balanced or unbalanced) cannot improve the utility from consumption complementar-
ity. Moreover, QI maximizes utility from preference for variety. Therefore, there are no
incentives to deviate and QI is an equilibrium.
A deviation upward always decreases utility from consumption complementarity. Notwith-
standing, for Q < QI there is some benet from increased variety. For Q less than but
18close to QI, however, this benet is innitesimally small (the FOC is satised at QI) and
it is outweighed by the utility loss from consumption complementarity. Therefore, Qs less
than but close to QI also characterize equilibria.
Lemma 6 shows that for some parameters there may also exist equilibria with QDI = 1.
Lemma 6 Assume that 1 < R < 2 and  > 0. There exist parameter values such that
QDI = 1 while QI > 1.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 40.
Notice that if b Q > 1, it is necessary that V (Q = 1) > V (b Q) for Q = 1 to be an
equilibrium. It follows from Lemma 3. However, there is nothing in the proof that
connects QDI = 1 to Qo. So the equilibrium at QDI = 1 may be disconnected from the
set of equilibria around QI.
The result of Lemma 6 is illustrated in Figure 3b. There we can see that equilibria
exist in two disconnected intervals: one interval around Q = 1 (recall that following
Remark 1 QD = 1 is the equilibrium under pure direct network eects) and the other one
around QI. In the interval around QD = 1, the strong consumption complementarities
(users consume the same few applications intensely) guarantee that users do not want to
deviate to consume more applications. In the interval around QI, the weak consumption
complementarities (users consume little of many applications) guarantee that users do
not want to deviate to consume fewer applications.
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Intervals of QDI.
Lemmas 5 and 6 show that there are always multiple equilibria. We now show that
the equilibria can be ranked according to users' utility. In particular, equilibria with
19fewer applications consumed yield higher utility than equilibria with more applications.
However, even when consumption complementarity is large relative to the preference for
variety and the allocation that maximizes users' utility is an equilibrium, the model does
not predict which of the many equilibria will be played or the utility that users will
achieve. Therefore, users face an equilibrium selection problem.
Proposition 2 (equilibrium selection problem) When 1 < R < 2 and  > 0 there
exist multiple balanced equilibria with dierent values of QDI. Equilibria with smaller QDI
yield higher utility than equilibria with larger QDI.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 41.
To understand the intuition, recall that function V (Q) is user utility in a situation
where every user consumes Q applications in a balanced way. Therefore, for values of
QDI that constitute a balanced equilibrium, V (QDI) is the utility that users obtain in
equilibrium. As follows from Lemma 3 and illustrated by Figure 2, equilibria only occur
for values of Q such that V (Q) is decreasing. Therefore, equilibrium utility must be
decreasing in QDI.
In conclusion, Propositions 1 and 2 identify two undesirable properties of equilib-
ria in environments where both direct and indirect network eects are present. When
preference for variety is large relative to consumption complementarity, users face a com-
mons problem because the allocation that maximizes users' utility is not an equilibrium.
Moreover, regardless of the values of  and R there are always multiple equilibria which
yield dierent levels of utility. Thus, users also face an equilibrium selection problem,
even when consumption complementarity is large relative to preference for variety and
the allocation that maximizes users' utility is an equilibrium. In the following subsec-
tion we show how the platform can alleviate these problems by limiting the number of
applications available.
2.4 On the role of the platform: creating value by limiting
choice
We conclude Section 2 by showing that users may benet when the platform limits the
number of applications available, but only when both direct and indirect network eects
are present. To examine the platform's choice of the number of applications available, A,
we relax the assumption that A 
 (R 1)X
p
 1
2 R.
20Notice rst that when pure direct network eects are present (i.e., R = 1 and  > 0),
users achieve the same net utility in all equilibria, for any A  1. Thus, the platform
cannot change the net utility that users achieve in an equilibrium by manipulating A.
Likewise, the platform cannot improve the equilibrium outcome under pure indirect net-
work eects (i.e., 1 < R < 2 and  = 0). From Section 2.2 we know that when A  QI
in an equilibrium under pure indirect network eects, every user consumes QI applica-
tions. When the platform sets 1 < A < QI then there exists a unique equilibrium|a
balanced equilibrium in which all users consume all A applications. But this yields lower
utility than consuming QI applications. Therefore, in the case of pure indirect network
eects the platform can only decrease users' utility when limiting the number of available
applications.16
We now turn to the case where both direct and indirect network eects are present
(i.e., 1 < R < 2 and  > 0). The following denition is helpful for the arguments that
follow. Let
Q
 = argmaxV (Q): (7)
From the shape of V follows that Q may be either 1 or b Q. In both cases Q  b Q <
QI.17 When Q = b Q > 1, then by Proposition 1, Q never characterizes a balanced
equilibrium. When Q = 1, it may characterize a balanced equilibrium (as Lemma 6
shows), but it not always does. We show that by limiting choice when Q is not an
equilibrium, the platform helps users solve the commons problem shown in Proposition 1;
i.e., the platform creates an equilibrium at Q. And when Q is an equilibrium, it will
typically be one of many equilibria where other equilibria yield lower utility than Q.
Thus, in this case by limiting choice, the platform helps users solve the selection problem
in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 shows that regardless of whether Q is in the equilibrium set of the
original game, the platform can ensure that Q becomes the only equilibrium of the game
by restricting A to Q.
Proposition 3 Assume that 1 < R < 2 and  > 0. If the platform sets A = Q, then
there exists a unique balanced equilibrium where all users consume Q applications.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 41.
16When A < QI, users strictly gain from access to a larger number of applications. And when A  QI,
the users do not gain or lose by having more applications available.
17Notice that whether Q = 1 or Q = b Q > 1 depends on the value of  relative to R. For small 
(as  = 0:03 in Figure 1) Q = b Q > 1. For larger  (as  = 0:06 and  = 0:1 in the gure), b Q > 1, but
Q = 1. For even larger  (as  = 0:16 in the gure), Q = b Q = 1.
21The proposition implies that the equilibrium set may change with changes in A. In
particular, when the platform sets A = Q, Q becomes the unique equilibrium.18
Therefore, when Q is in the original equilibrium set, if the platform constrains A to be
equal to Q, it eliminates all equilibria that yield lower utility for the users and, thus,
eliminates the possibility that users select an inferior equilibrium. Hence,
Corollary 1 Assume that 1 < R < 2 and  > 0. When Q is in the equilibrium set,
users may benet when the platform restricts the number of available applications to Q.
On the other hand, if Q is not in the original equilibrium set, when the platform
constrains A to be equal to Q, it creates a new equilibrium that makes users better o
than all the original equilibria. Thus,
Corollary 2 Assume that 1 < R < 2 and  > 0. When Q is not in the equilibrium
set, users strictly benet when the platform restricts the number of available applications
to Q.
In summary, when consumption complementarity is large relative to preference for
variety, then Q is in the equilibrium set and the platform can eliminate other equilibria
(which yield lower utility) by limiting the number of applications available. When prefer-
ence for variety is large relative to consumption complementarity, then Q is not in the
equilibrium set, and by limiting the number of applications, the platform creates a new,
unique, equilibrium that yields the highest possible utility.
If users gain higher utility from participation in the platform, the platform provider
may collect higher access fees from them. For example, in environments where user access
fees are the only source of revenue to the platform, users' utility maximization is perfectly
aligned with the platform's prot maximization. Perfect alignment may be lost when the
platform has other revenue streams (such as royalties). We elaborate on this in Section 4.
3 Game with no foresight
Whenever direct network eects are present, the equilibria studied in Section 2 require
users to know exactly which applications are consumed by all other users. That is, our
18We note that not all changes in A result in reducing the equilibrium set to a singleton. Put dierently,
it is not the case that the platform can ensure that any Q will be played in equilibrium by setting A = Q.
For example, if the platform sets A = QI it cannot ensure that the equilibrium with QI applications will
be played, as many other equilibria are possible in this case.
22assumption has been one of perfect foresight about other users' choices in equilibrium.
Under perfect foresight player k knows the cardinality and the identity of the applications
that all other users will consume; moreover, she also knows how much of each application
other users consume. In many environments, such perfect foresight may be dicult to
achieve. As an alternative, now we assume no foresight by which we mean that users
initially assign equal probability to any feasible strategy of other users. However, they
rene their beliefs by Bayesian updating and eventually reach equilibrium beliefs.19 The
literature has pointed out that in the presence of network eects, equilibria are inuenced
by the way users form their expectations.20 Therefore, we study in this section how
equilibria change when we step away from perfect foresight in beliefs formation.
Only the assumption about user beliefs dierentiates this game from the game in
Section 2. Recall that xk = fxk
1;xk
2;:::;xk
Ag such that
P
a2A xk
a = X denotes a feasible
consumption vector. We use xk to also denote a pure strategy. Let X denote the set of
all pure strategies for any given user.21 Let k
l  U[X] denote user k's beliefs on user l's
choice of pure strategy. Let k = fk
l gl6=k be a vector that denotes user k's beliefs on all
other users' choices of pure strategy.
With this, user k's utility from consuming vector xk is
Eku(x
k) =
X
a2A
 
x
k
a
1=R
R
+ 
X
a2A
 
x
k
a Ek
X
l6=k
x
l
a

;
and the optimization problem (2) becomes: maxxk
a;a2A
n
Eku(xk)   p 
P
a2A 1(xk
a)
o
,
subject to X 
P
a2A xk
a.
It is straightforward to show that under no foresight the expectation over consumption
of any application a by any other user l 6= k is Ek
l xl
a = X
A and Ek
P
l6=k xl
a = (N  
1)X
A.22 Note that this expectation does not depend on how many applications or which
applications all other users consume, therefore there is no interdependence between users'
choices. Given this, we now can nd the optimal choice by user k (which in our setting is
independent of what all other users do). Whatever is the number of applications Gk that
user k wishes to consume, her optimal consumption pattern is balanced consumption, i.e.,
dividing the time budget equally among the applications consumed. Once user k decides
that G is the optimal number of applications for her to consume, it does not matter
19We consider such updating to be realistic. In the experiment of El-Gamal and Grether (1995)
overwhelming majority of subjects used Bayes updating rule.
20See, for example, Hurkens and Lopez (2010).
21Because all users are identical, they all have access to the same set of pure strategies.
22For formal proofs of these equalities see Section 3 of Casadesus-Masanell and Ha  laburda (2010).
23which subset of A she chooses, as all yield the same expected utility. Therefore, G fully
describes k's set of best responses.
User k updates her beliefs using Bayes' Rule. Therefore, she assigns zero probability
to dominated strategies and equal probability to undominated strategies. Since with no
foresight she does not know which applications they consume, she believes that every
subset of A with cardinality G is equally likely to be consumed by user l 6= k. User k
recalculates her best response under the updated beliefs, until the recalculated best re-
sponse is exactly the same as the original best response. If every user behaves this way,
beliefs are consistent with strategies and this constitutes a no-foresight equilibrium.
We consider the case where both direct and indirect network eects are present (i.e.,
1 < R < 2 and  > 0).23 Let Gk
DI be the number of applications consumed by user k in
a no-foresight equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (coordination problem) Suppose 1 < R < 2 and  > 0. In every
no-foresight equilibrium, every user k consumes Gk
DI = GDI = QI applications in equal
amount, where QI =

(R 1)X
p
 1
2 R
> 1. The expected equilibrium net utility is
EUDI(GDI) = G
R 1
DI X + X(N   1)
X
A
  pGDI: (8)
Moreover, the platform maximizes users' net utility by setting the number of available
applications to A = Q, where Q is given by (7).
Proof. See Appendix B, page 41.
In the game with no foresight, users face a coordination problem. Since users do not
know which applications are consumed by other users, some of the benet to the direct
network eects is lost. The utility that users can achieve in this environment is lower
than in the environment with perfect foresight, because users cannot exploit consumption
complementarities as well due to lack of coordination. In such a situation, the platform
can create value by limiting the number of available applications. So long as A > Q,
the equilibrium is inecient, especially when A is large. Only when A = Q, the ecient
outcome is an equilibrium. By providing fewer applications, the platform creates a new
equilibrium and alleviates this coordination problem. We note that under no foresight,
users do not face neither equilibrium selection nor commons problems.
23The analysis of pure direct and pure indirect network eects is straightforward and can be found in
the working paper Casadesus-Masanell and Ha  laburda (2010).
244 Discussion
In this section we discuss several aspects of our approach.
Consumption complementarity and preference for variety. Although for expo-
sitional simplicity we have presented the model with reference to network eects, all that
we need for the results to go through is the presence of consumption complementarities
and preference for variety. Consumption complementarities always imply direct network
eects. Preference for variety, however, does not always imply indirect network eects.
To illustrate this point, note a key dierence between hardware-software platforms (e.g.,
Nintendo) and betting platforms (e.g., Betfair). In the case of Nintendo, users benet
from game variety as provided by a large number of independent developers, and devel-
opers benet from a large number of users to sell games. Thus, preference for variety and
indirect network eects go hand-in-hand in this case. This contrasts with Betfair where
punters (back and lay sides) benet from a large variety of sporting events to bet on,
but where there are no independent event providers that benet from there being more
punters (as Betfair is the only provider of events on its platform). Although there are no
indirect network eects in this case, our analysis and results apply.
Exogenous p. We have analyzed the user side only and assumed that the price of
accessing an application, p, is exogenous. While to better understand the interactions
between users and developers it would be interesting to extend the model to endogenous
p, to do so would require imposing substantial assumptions on industry structure on the
developer side (entry conditions, production cost, number of games sold by each developer,
and so on). Of course, the equilibrium p would not be innocuous to such assumptions.
However, a critical implication of our analysis is that the platform cannot induce users
to consume the optimal number of applications by manipulating p.24 Put dierently,
we have shown that regardless of the value of p, the commons, equilibrium selection,
and coordination problems will arise when, in addition to preference for variety, there
are direct network eects. Therefore, our conclusion that it is valuable for platforms to
manage the number of applications available holds regardless of whether p is endogenous
24The exception is a situation where the platform drives p so high that QI = 1, which we assumed
away on page 11. In this case, users consume one application which is the optimal number. For details,
see the working paper version (Casadesus-Masanell and Ha  laburda 2010).
25or exogenous.25; 26
Value creation and value capture. We have analyzed how limiting the number
of available applications aects value created; that is, user surplus. However, we have
not considered how the platform may capture that value through prices (access prices
and/or royalties). A detailed analysis of platform pricing is beyond the scope of this
paper and left for future research. Pricing decisions may depend on specic institutional
or competitive details. Our analysis applies to the user side of the market regardless of
these details. One can imagine extending our analysis to a particular institutional setting
to nd the optimal pricing strategy.
Consider rst the case where the platform can only charge access fees to users (no
royalties to developers). Then, the prot-maximizing number of applications coincides
with Q and access price to users is equal to users' net utility. This will not be the case
when the platform charges only royalties and no access fees. In this case, the platform
earns higher prot when a larger number of applications are purchased. Therefore, selling
QI applications maximizes prots, and the platform does not benet from limiting the
number of applications below QI. Even when the platform oers QI or more applica-
tions, there are still multiple equilibria. Thus, the platform cannot guarantee that QI
applications are purchased. Nonetheless, in any equilibrium users consume more than Q
applications (the number of applications that maximizes user surplus), since the commons
problem remains. However, the commons problem does not aect the platform's revenue.
Finally, consider a platform that collects both access prices and royalties. In this case,
the prot-maximizing number of applications will lie somewhere between b Q and QI. The
commons problem does not go away but it becomes less relevant to the platform.
Implementing quantity restrictions. While the method we have considered in
Sections 2.4 and 3 for correcting the commons, equilibrium selection, and coordination
problems|outright restriction on the number of applications available|might seem bru-
tally direct, there are indirect ways to implement it. One such way is through manipula-
25Although p is often endogenous, it is not hard to think of cases where it is exogenous, particularly
when technological reasons constrain p to be zero. For example, open television channels are free to users
as it is impossible to exclude access to them. In this case, p may not be used as a coordinating device.
Although we have assumed that p > 0, our results apply when p = 0 as well. Interested readers can nd
the complete analysis of the case p = 0 in Appendix B of the working paper version (Casadesus-Masanell
and Ha  laburda 2010).
26In this paper, we have considered a situation where users pay price p > 0 to access each application,
and face a time budget constraint X. However, there is no monetary cost of using applications (i.e.,
no rental cost). Under rental cost, the commons, equilibrium selection, and coordination problems may
also occur. For details see Appendix B of the working paper, which considers the case of p = 0, and is
equivalent to a setting where there is a rental cost for applications but no access price.
26tion of the access fees and/or royalties charged to developers. High prices to developers
will lead to less entry and a smaller set of applications available, resulting in possibly
more value for users. An interesting and counterintuitive implication of our results is
that to the extent that higher access prices to developers result in net utility gains to
users, the platform will be able to charge higher prices to the user side. Of course, this
runs counter to the conventional wisdom that to earn more from one side of the market,
the platform must set lower prices to the other side.
Another indirect way to narrow down the set of applications available is by tinkering
with user search. For example, in the late 1980s and 1990s, Nintendo used Nintendo
Power|an in-house magazine priced to break even and carried no advertising|to pro-
mote particular games. Two years after it had launched, it had become the highest-
circulation publication targeted to children in the United States. Games not featured on
Nintendo Power were much less likely to become commercial successes.27 Likewise, the
current search capabilities on Apple's App Store are notoriously decient.28 Applications
appear ranked by number of downloads which, of course, reinforces direct network eects
for applications|such as word processors (Pages), spreadsheet programs (Numbers), or
presentation software (Keynote)|that exhibit consumption complementarities.
Royalties and double marginalization. Our results suggest a possible resolution
to an issue in the video game market that has traditionally been seen as a puzzle. Console
makers typically charge royalties to game developers. This seems like a bad idea due to
double marginalization. One explanation is that royalties are an instrument to compel
developers to raise the quality of games. Because games are more expensive in the pres-
ence of royalties, fewer, but better, games are developed. Thus, royalties are often seen
as resolving a tradeo between quality and quantity. Our analysis shows that there may
be no tradeo because the platform may prefer both, better-quality games but also fewer
games. Moreover, because they ultimately limit the number of applications available,
the motive for royalties in the video game industry could be exactly the same as the
rationale for Betfair to limit the number of betting events on its platform. To the best
of our knowledge, the idea that royalties and restrictions on application variety might be
derived from the same underlying force is new to the literature.
Competing platforms. While analysis of competing platforms is beyond the scope
of this paper, it is easy to see an interesting tradeo that is likely to emerge when direct
27See Brandenburger (1995).
28See, for example, http://accidentaltechnologist.com/apple/apple-please-x-the-app-store-search/
or http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Mobile-and-Wireless/10-Apple-App-Store-Problems-That-Need-Fixing-
Now-412975/.
27and indirect network eects are at play. Consider a situation with two platforms compet-
ing for a given set of users. If one of the platforms limits the number of applications when
there is preference for variety, users will likely expend some of their budget on applica-
tions from the second platform. Thus, by limiting choice, the platform may potentially
create additional value, but users are more likely to multi-home and crowd out some of
their limited resources to the other platform. As a result, competition for users is likely
to have a mitigating eect on the platform's desire to limit choice.
Subgame perfection. This paper analyzes subgame-perfect equilibria of a two-stage
game. We now argue that we are not losing any balanced equilibria by using the subgame
perfection renement of Nash equilibria. To see this, note rst that strategies that involve
buying applications that are not consumed are strictly dominated and therefore will never
be played in any Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the same argument that allowed us to focus
on equilibria where all users purchase and use the same applications (Lemma 1) also
applies to all Nash equilibria. This means that all Nash equilibria have users buying and
consuming the same applications. Therefore, every equilibrium can be characterized by
Q, the number of applications bought and consumed. Now we can show that every Q that
does not characterize a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium cannot be a Nash equilibrium
(without renement). As we show in the paper, if Q does not characterize a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium, then there exists a protable unilateral upward or downward
deviation to a dierent number of applications. But the same deviation is available
even without the subgame perfection renement. Therefore, such a Q cannot be a Nash
equilibrium. In the paper, we focus on subgame perfection for technical convenience.29
Generalized formulation. In this paper we have analyzed a micro-founded model.
A micro-foundation has allowed us to clearly discuss the intuition behind the economic
forces driving our main results. In Appendix A we present a generalized formulation
of the problem and show that our main results continue to hold in this more general
setting. Specically, the generalization suggests that the results do not depend on our
restriction to balanced equilibria. Moreover, since the generalization does not involve any
renements of equilibria, it reinforces our earlier point that subgame perfection entails
no loss of generality.
29If the game was solved as a one-stage game, then users would directly maximize utility as given by
equation (1), subject to the budget constraint. Note that the rst-order conditions in the users' maxi-
mization problem involve dealing with derivatives of indicator functions. In the two-stage formulation,
this problem does not arise. Thus, analyzing the two-stage game is technically more convenient and
entails no loss of generality.
285 Conclusion
We have shown that when users enjoy application variety but also benet from con-
sumption complementarities, three problems may arise: the socially optimal number of
applications may not be part of an equilibrium; multiple equilibria ensue; and users will
likely nd it hard to coordinate consumption. The analysis has demonstrated that by
limiting the number of applications, the platform can provide a solution to these prob-
lems. Specically, by limiting choice the platform may create new equilibria that do not
exist when application choice is broad. In addition, it can eliminate equilibria that yield
lower utility. Moreover, it can reduce the severity of the coordination problem faced by
users.
The overall conclusion is that when direct and indirect network eects are at play,
an important governance decision that platforms face is the choice of the number of
applications that should be allowed to run on them. To implement such a choice, the
platform may directly suppress access to developers and impose quantity constraints, or
it may limit the number of applications indirectly through setting high access prices to
developers.
While we have shown that the platform may create value by limiting choice, the rec-
ommendation to practitioners is obviously not \provide as few applications as possible."
Rather, it is that even in settings where users have a strong preference for variety, the
platform provider must be cognizant that there may be a number beyond which oer-
ing more applications will decrease users' utility and, thus, overall platform value. This
recommendation is in stark contrast to the conventional wisdom that platforms should
encourage the development of complements to the maximal possible extent.
The obvious next step in this research is the endogenization of access prices in a setting
with competing platforms and direct and indirect network eects. Given the complexity
of the analysis when users are the only strategic players, we expect these extensions to
be challenging. It is our hope to have provided a solid rst step on which to build general
theories of platform competition that will shed further light on the value that platforms
may create by acting as gatekeepers.
29Appendix
A Generalized formulation
In this appendix we present a generalized formulation of the micro-founded model of the main
paper. In this formulation we abstract from the intensive margin (how X is allocated across
applications). The analysis demonstrates that we do not lose any generality by focusing on
balanced equilibria in the main paper.
Given the consumption of other users (fQlgl6=k), the net utility of user k is:
Uk(Qk;fQlgl6=k) = v(Qk) + w(Qk;fQlgl6=k)   pQk;
where v represents the utility derived from variety, and w represents the utility resulting from
consumption complementarity. We assume that v is increasing and concave, that is v0 > 0 and
v00 < 0. Therefore, consuming more applications brings higher utility from variety. However,
the additional value of more applications decreases as more applications are being consumed.
In our micro-foundation, the concavity of v is due to the xed time budget X: consuming more
applications implies consuming less of each application. In the generalized formulation, it is also
possible that concavity is driven to other reasons such as users getting fed up with too much
variety|due, for example, to limited attention.
Although w is a function of N arguments, we sometimes write w(Q) to mean that Ql = Q
for all l. To simplify notation, we use w(Qk;Q) to mean w(Qk;fQlgl6=k) when Ql = Q for all
l 6= k.30 We assume w0(Q) < 0 and w00(Q) <  v00(Q).31 In our micro-foundation, w is decreasing
because as all users consume more applications, they consume less of each one, which implies
that they do not fully exploit consumption complementarities. In the generalized formulation,
this may be due to other factors such as increasing returns to spending more eort on one
particular application consumed with other users. We also assume:
@w(Qk;Q)
@Qk

 
 
Qk=Q
8
<
:
= 0; Qk < Q
< 0; Qk > Q:
This derivative accounts for individual deviations by user k from Q. A deviation downward has
no eect on the payo from consumption complementarity. This is a natural assumption that is
validated by our micro-foundation. We later explore the consequences of relaxing this assump-
30It is easy to show that in equilibrium it must be the case that all users consume the same applications.
Thus, in considering deviations by user k, it is enough to consider deviations given that all other users
consume the same applications.
31Note that in the model in the main text, this condition is not always satised. However, it is satised
on the relevant range of Qs. Specically, it is satised for Q  b Q.
30tion. A deviation upward decreases the utility from consumption complementarity because the
user takes away time from consuming the same applications as other users consume. We also
assume that
@w(Qk;Q)
@Qk > w0(Q) for all Q. This means that in an unilateral deviation upward,
the user loses less than if everybody increases consumption.
Due to homogeneity of agents and consumption complementarity, it follows that in any
equilibrium all users will consume exactly the same applications. We use this fact to characterize
the allocation b Q that maximizes net utility.
Lemma A1 Suppose that v > 0. Then, in an interior solution, the utility maximizing alloca-
tion b Q satises v0( b Q) + w0( b Q) = p.32
Note that when there is only preference for variety (w = 0), every user consumes QI appli-
cations, where v0(QI) = p. It is easy to see that when w > 0, b Q < QI.
Propositions A1 and A2 below show that in this set up, the commons problem and multi-
plicity of equilibria are still present. It is convenient to dene V (Q) = v(Q) + w(Q)   pQ:
Proposition A1 (commons problem) b Q is not an equilibrium. Specically, for any user k,
U(Qk = b Q + "; b Q) > V ( b Q) > V ( b Q + ").
Proof. Consider a unilateral upward deviation from b Q. The deviator's utility is:
U( b Q + "; b Q) = v( b Q + ") + w( b Q + "; b Q)   p( b Q + "):
Now we will show
@ U( b Q + "; b Q)
@ "

 
 
"=0+
> 0;
which means that there exists a protable unilateral deviation from b Q. Note,
@ U( b Q + "; b Q)
@ "

 
 
"=0+
= v0( b Q) +
@ w( b Q + "; b Q)
@ "
  p > v0( b Q) + w0( b Q)   p = 0:
The last equality follows from Lemma A1, and the inequality from our assumption
@w(Qk;Q)
@Qk >
w0(Q). Thus, every individual has the incentive to deviate upward. When all users choose to
consume b Q + " for some " > 0, each user ends up receiving payo V ( b Q + "). But this must be
less than V ( b Q), since b Q maximizes V .
Proposition A2 (equilibrium selection problem) There exist multiple equilibria with dif-
ferent values of QDI. Equilibria with smaller QDI yield higher utility than equilibria with
higher QDI.
32Our assumption w00( b Q) <  v00( b Q) guarantees that the second order condition is satised.
31Proof. We will examine incentives to deviate downward and upward from any given Q. We
will nd that there are no protable deviations downward from Q < QI, and that there are no
protable deviations upward from Q < QI but \close" to QI.
Consider deviations downward. Consider a situation where all users consume Q applications.
We now explore whether user k has an incentive to deviate downward. Note,
@ w(Q + ";Q)
@ "

 
 
"=0 
| {z }
=0
+ v0(Q)   p
| {z }
+ if Q<QI   if Q>QI
8
<
:
> 0 if Q < QI
< 0 if Q > QI:
(9)
Because (9) is negative when Q > QI, user k benets by deviating downward. Conversely, the
user loses by deviating downward from Q < QI. Thus, none of Q > QI can be an equilibrium.
Now, let's consider upward deviations. Note,
@ w(Q + ";Q)
@ "


 

"=0+
| {z }
<0
+ v0(Q)   p
| {z }
+ if Q<QI   if Q>QI
(10)
Notice that for all Q  QI, (10) is strictly negative. Hence, there is no incentive to deviate
upward. Moreover, from the proof of Proposition A1 we know that (10) is strictly positive at
b Q. Therefore, by continuity, there must exist Q 2 ( b Q;QI) such that (10) is also negative. We
conclude that for those Q there are no incentives to deviate upward or downward. Therefore,
the equilibrium set includes QI and these Q 2 ( b Q;QI) for which (10) is negative.
We now turn to proving the second part of the proposition. The fact that equilibria with
smaller QDI yield higher utility than equilibria with higher QDI follows from w00(Q) <  v00(Q).
Since in all equilibria all users consume the same applications, each user's utility in an equilib-
rium Q is given by V (Q). Since w00(Q) <  v00(Q), V (Q) is strictly decreasing for Q > b Q and
all equilibria are Q > b Q. Hence, equilibria with smaller Q yield higher utility.
Extensions
Here, we explore the implications of dierent versions of our assumptions. In particular, we
consider the role of our assumptions on @w(Qk;Q)=@Qk. Let
@w(Qk;Q)
@Qk

 
 
Qk=Q
=
8
<
:
a; Qk > Q
b; Qk < Q:
(11)
In the baseline model, we have assumed that a < 0 and b = 0. For other values of a and
b, we can use the proof of Proposition A2 to see that a regulates value Qa, below which the
32user has incentive to deviate upward. Thus, no Q < Qa can be an equilibrium. Similarly, b
regulates value Qb, above which the user has incentive to deviate downward. Thus, no Q > Qb
can be an equilibrium. However, for Q 2 [Qa;Qb] the user has no incentive to deviate upward
nor downward, hence those values constitute equilibria.
Remark A1 Suppose that a and b characterize the derivative in equation (11).
 When a = b, then Qa = Qb, and there is a unique equilibrium.
 When a < b, then Qa < Qb, and there is a nonempty interval [Qa;Qb] of equilibrium
values.
 When a > b, then Qa > Qb, and the interval [Qa;Qb] is empty, and there is no pure-
strategy equilibrium.
If the platform sets A  Qa, then QDI = A is a pure-strategy equilibrium.
The remark says that we obtain multiple equilibria only if a < b. In this case, as in the
main paper, the platform creates value by limiting the number of applications available because
that prevents suboptimal equilibria from being played. When a > b there is no pure-strategy
equilibrium. However, there is still value in the platform limiting the number of applications
available. By doing so, the platform creates a pure-strategy equilibrium which should bring
higher utility than any mixed-strategy equilibrium.
The next result identies the relation between Qa, Qb, and QI.
Remark A2 For j = a; b, if j < 0 then Qj < QI, if j = 0 then Qj = QI, and if j > 0
then Qj > QI. Therefore, a non-empty interval [Qa;Qb] may include QI, be entirely below, or
entirely above QI.
Thus, our qualitative results hold for more general conditions (on w) than what we have
considered in the main part of this appendix.
Contrary to the generalized formulation presented in this appendix, the micro-founded model
in the main body of the paper is more closely related to the phenomenon that we study. Indeed,
the main properties of functions v and w assumed in the generalized formulation are derived
from the more specic utility function and textured environment in the micro-founded model.
This allows us to better understand how the forces driving our results play out in the market.
B Proofs
Proof of Remark 1 (page 9). First, we nd the optimal consumption pattern for user k,
given that k has access to some set Q  A of applications. Let xl be a pure strategy of user
33l 6= k and a0 be an application such that
P
l6=k xl
a0 
P
l6=k xl
a for all a 2 Q. In equilibrium,
user k does not consume other applications than a0. If there is only one a0, the best response of
user k is to consume only this one application, i.e., xk
a0 = X and xk
a = 0 for a 6= a0. If there is
more than one a0, any allocation of time budget X across all those applications yields exactly
the same consumption utility.
Given this optimal consumption pattern, user k needs to decide on the set of applications
that she consumes, Q, in order to maximize her net utility. If there exists unique a0 2 A such
that
P
l6=k xl
a0 
P
l6=k xl
a for all a 2 A, then the optimal choice of applications for user k is a
singleton Qk
D = fa0g. Notice that it leads to an equilibrium, where all users allocate their whole
time budget to the same application, i.e., Qk
D = QD = fa0g and xk
a0 = X for all k. Therefore, it
is a balanced equilibrium. Since any a0 2 A would constitute such an equilibrium, there are A
equilibria of this form.
Finally, to see that there is no other equilibrium, suppose that there are more than one a0
such that
P
l6=k xl
a0 
P
l6=k xl
a. Since the price of an application is strictly positve, user k's best
response is to consume only one of such applications. Therefore, there cannot be an equilibrium
with QD  2.
Proof of Remark 2 (page 10). The assumption that  = 0 implies that user k's consumption
utility (and net utility) does not depend on other users' strategies and thus subgame perfect
equilibrium is equivalent to nonstrategic optimal choices by all player. Given this, we rst nd
the optimal consumption pattern, given that user k has access to some set Q of applications,
where cardinality of Q is Q  1. The rst order condition for utility maximization implies that
every application is consumed in the same amount, i.e., ^ xk
a = ^ x for all a 2 Q. Since the utility
function is strictly monotone, the constraint X 
P
a2Q xk
a needs to bind. Therefore Q^ x = X
and ^ x = X
Q. That implies that every equilibrium must be a balanced equilibrium.
With ^ x = X
Q, the maximal consumption utility given Q is
uI(^ x;Q) =
X
a2Q

X
Q
 1
R R
=
 
Q

X
Q
 1
R
!R
= QR 1X ;
and thus user k's maximal net utility is UI(^ x;Q) = QR 1X   pQ.
The optimal number of applications consumed by user k is characterized by the rst order
condition
(R   1)QR 2X = p () Q =

X(R   1)
p
 1
2 R
:= qI : (12)
The number of applications consumed cannot be greater than A or smaller than 1. Recall
that we have assumed that A  qI.33 Therefore, the optimal number of applications consumed
33If we had allowed for A < qI, it would be optimal for a user to consume all A applications. This is
34by any user k is Qk
I = maxf1;qIg.
Since the optimal number of applications consumed is the same for all users, let QI denote
Qk
I for any k. Thus, fQ1
I;:::;QN
I g constitutes an equilibrium if and only if the cardinality of
Qk
I is QI for all k. All equilibria clearly yield the same, highest possible utility to the users.
Proof of Lemma 1 (page 12). Suppose, to the contrary, that in some equilibrium Qk 6= Ql
for some l and k (we drop the subscript DI in this proof for clarity of exposition).
First, consider the case where Qk = Ql, i.e., user k and user l consume the same amount
of applications, but dierent ones. Take an application a0 that k consumes, but l does not,
and application a00 that l consumes but k does not. Suppose, without loss of generality, that
P
j6=l;k x
j
a0 
P
j6=l;k x
j
a00. User k's net utility in such a candidate equilibrium is
 X
a2Qk

xk
a
 1
R R
+ 
X
a2Qkrfa0g

xk
a
X
j6=k
xj
a

+ xk
a0
X
j6=k;l
x
j
a0   pQk :
If user k spends xk
a0 consuming application a00 instead of a0 (without changing anything else),
she increases her utility to
 X
a2Qk

xk
a
 1
R R
+ 
X
a2Qkrfa0g

xk
a
X
j6=k
xj
a

+ xk
a0
 X
j6=k;l
x
j
a00 + xl
a00
| {z }
>
P
j6=k; l x
j
a0

  pQk :
Therefore, it is not an equilibrium since  > 0.
Second, consider the case where Ql > Qk in a balanced equilibrium. In this case, for the
same reason as above, Qk  Ql. Since they play balanced strategies, xl
a = X
Ql for a 2 Ql, and
xk
a = X
Qk for a 2 Qk, and xk
a = 0 for all other applications. For k, it is optimal to consume Qk.
Such consumption yields the net utility

Qk
R 1
X + 
X
Qk
X
a2Qk
 X
j6=k;l
xj
a

+ 
X
Qk Qk X
Ql   pQk:
In particular, consuming Qk applications yields higher utility for user k than consuming the
same Ql applications as user l, i.e.,

Ql
R 1
X+

X
Ql
2
Qk+
X
Ql
X
a2Ql
 X
j6=k;l
xj
a

 pQl 

Qk
R 1
X+
X2
Ql +
X
Qk
X
a2Qk
 X
j6=k;l
xj
a

 pQk =)
because the derivative of UI(^ x;Q) is strictly positive for all Q < qI. So it would be positive on the whole
domain [1;A] for A < qI.
35=) X

Ql
R 1
 

Qk
R 1
+X
 
1
Ql
X
a2Ql
 
X
j6=k;l
xj
a

 
1
Qk
X
a2Qk
 X
j6=k;l
xj
a

 p

Ql Qk


 
X2
Ql

1  
Qk
Ql

: (13)
For l, consuming Ql applications yields higher utility for user l than consuming only Qk
applications, i.e.,
X

(Ql)R 1 (Qk)R 1

+X

1
Ql
X
a2Ql
 X
j6=k;l
xj
a

 
1
Qk
X
a2Qk
 X
j6=k;l
xj
a

 p

Ql Qk

 X2

1
Qk  
1
Ql

:
(14)
However, for Ql > Qk  1,  X2
Ql

1 
Qk
Ql

< X2

1
Qk   1
Ql

. Therefore, both inequalities
(13) and (14) cannot be satised at the same time. Thus, it cannot be that there is a balanced
equilibrium where Ql > Qk.
Proof of Lemma 2 (page 12). By Lemma 1, we know that all users consume the same QDI
applications. Since the net utility of users is the same as long as all users consume the same
QDI applications, any subset of applications QDI of cardinality QDI constitutes an equilibrium.
Proof of Remark 3 (page 14). The remark directly follows from Lemma 7.
Lemma 7 For all parameters   0 and 1  R < 2, QI  b Q. Moreover when QI > 1, then
b Q < QI, and when QI = 1, then b Q = QI.
Proof. QI and b Q are dened based on the solution (qI) to the following rst order conditions,
respectively:
(R   1)QR 2X   p
| {z }
DI(Q)
= 0: (15)
b D(Q) = (R   1)QR 2X   p
| {z }
DI(Q)
  X(N   1)
X
Q2
| {z }
+
= 0: (16)
Therefore, whenever b D = 0 for some e Q, then DI > 0 for this e Q. Moreover, since the
derivative DI is decreasing, DI = 0 for a larger Q than e Q. Therefore, the solution to the
rst order condition (15) (denoted by qI) is always larger than any solution to the rst order
condition (16), if the solution to the latter exists.
We focus on the non-trivial case when QI > 1.34 This happens when qI > 1. The value of
34For QI = 1, which happens when qI < 1, any solution to (16) must also be smaller than 1. Then
b Q = 1 = QI.
36b Q is either a solution to (16) or 1. In either case b Q < qI = QI.
Proof of Proposition 1 (page 14). Consider a unilateral balanced deviation to " more
applications. The deviator consumes X=( b Q + ") of each application. Note that the payo from
this upward deviation under balanced consumption is
UDI( b Q + "jbalanced) =

b Q + "
R 1
X +   b Q
X
b Q + "
(N   1)
X
  b Q
  p

b Q + "

;
which is the same as V ( b Q + "). Therefore, because V 0( b Q) = 0, V ( b Q + ") is maximized at
" = 0. This means that such an upward deviation with balanced consumption from b Q brings
no additional utility.
We now argue that an unbalanced deviation is strictly protable. Suppose that the deviator
consumes " of new applications (which nobody else consumes), in addition to b Q of old applica-
tions (which all other agents consume). It is easy to show that the deviator optimally consumes
the same amount of each of b Q old applications; we call this amount b x. She also consumes in the
same amount each of " new applications; we call this amount x". However, without imposing
balanced consumption, b x and x" may be dierent. Thus, the consumption utility from upward
deviation to b Q + " is
uDI( b Q+") =

b Q(b x)
1
R + "(x")
1
R
R
+b xX(N 1) =

b Q(b x)
1
R + "1  1
R(X   b x b Q)
1
R
R
+b xX(N 1):
The last equality follows from the constraint b x b Q + x"" = X. To maximize the cosumption
utility, the agent chooses b x to satisfy FOC:

b Q(b x)
1
R + "1  1
R(X   b x b Q)
1
R
R 1
b Q

b x
1
R 1   "1  1
R(X   b x b Q)
1
R 1

+ X(N   1) = 0:
Because other terms are positive, b x satises the FOC only if b x
1
R 1   "1  1
R(X   b x b Q)
1
R 1 
b x
1
R 1 x
1
R 1
" < 0. And since 1 < R < 2, it implies b x > x". Therefore, the optimal upward devi-
ation is characterized by unbalanced consumption, and is strictly better than the best possible
balanced deviation. Hence, the optimal upward deviation is strictly protable. This implies
that b Q is not a balanced equilibrium.35
Proof of Lemma 3 (page 15). Suppose that all users play a balanced strategy where they
consume a set of applications Q with cardinality Q.
35Notice the implication of this result for the incentives in the market: Suppose that the platform
limits the number of applications to b Q, and b Q is optimal. Thus, the platform guarantees users the
best equilibrium outcome. Nonetheless, the users are not happy with this restriction. They may believe
(because they look at their protable deviation upward) that if one more application would be available,
they would be better o. But, of course, in an equilibrium they would not.
37In the rst step of the proof, suppose that Q > QI. Given that 1 < R < 2 and  > 0, if user
k consumes Q or fewer applications, i.e., Qk  Q, she consumes the same applications as other
users, i.e., Qk  Q, according to a balanced consumption schedule: X
Qk of each. Therefore, the
net utility when user k consumes Qk  Q applications is
UDI(Qk  Q) =

Qk
R 1
X +    Qk
X
    Qk(N   1)
X
Q
  pQk :
Since p > 0, the optimal number of applications that user k would like to consume is characterize
by the rst order condition
@UDI(Qk  Q)
@Qk = (R   1)

Qk
R 2
X   p = 0: (17)
Note that this is the same condition as (12) in the proof of Remark 2. So Qk = qI is the only
positive value satisfying this condition. Therefore, for any Q > QI, user k can protably deviate
to consuming QI applications.
In the second step of the proof, we turn to Q such that maxf1;Q?g  Q < b Q, and we show
that an upward deviation with a balanced consumption schedule is protable for any user. The
net utility from user k's balanced consumption of Qk  Q applications is
UDI(Qk  Qjbalanced) =

Qk
R 1
X +   Q
X
Qk(N   1)
X
  Q
  pQk :
Note that UDI(Qk  Qjbalanced) is the same as V (Q) in equation (4) which has a local max-
imum at b Q > Q. Moreover, if there does not exist Q?  1, then for any Q 2 [1; b Q), and when
Q?  1 exists, then for any Q 2 (Q?; b Q), UDI( b Q > Q) > UDI(Q). Also, by the denition of
Q?, UDI( b Q > Q) = UDI(Q?). The most protable deviation, however, involves a non-balanced
consumption schedule, and yields strictly higher utility than UDI(Qk > Q). Therefore, the
optimal deviation away from Q? is protable.
Proof of Lemma 4 (page 17). Given that  > 0, if user k consumes Q or fewer applications,
i.e., Qk  Q, she consumes the same applications as other users, i.e., Qk  Q. Also, by usual
arguments we nd that the consumption schedule maximizing the consumption utility, under
the constraint
P
a2Qk xk
a  X is balanced strategy, i.e., xk
a = X
Qk for all a 2 Qk.
Therefore, the net utility of user k from consuming Qk applications is
UDI(Qk;Q) =
 
QkR 1X + X(N   1)
X
Q
  pQk : (18)
Drawing on properties of UI, notice that UDI increases with Qk. That is, the user achieves a
lower utility if she deviates from Q < QI to Qk < Q.
38Proof of Lemma 5 (page 18). Since Lemma 4 shows that there is no protable deviation
downward, it is enough to show that there is no protable deviation upward.
Consider user k who consumes Qk > QI applications. When user k diverts part of her time
y away from the QI applications that all other users consume, it is optimal for her to consume
the same amount of each application in QI,
X y
QI . Moreover, it is also optimal to consume the
same amount of each application that user k consumes outside QI,
y
Qk QI. Then, the net utility
of user k is
UDI(Qk > QIjy) =
 
QI

X   y
QI
 1
R
+ (Qk   QI)

y
Qk   QI
 1
R
!R
+
X(X   y)
QI
(N 1) pQk :
Consider rst only the part of the net utility without the direct network eects, i.e., the rst
and third terms. This is the same as the utility under pure indirect network eects. We know
from the proof of Remark 2 that for any Qk, the utility maximizing consumption schedule
is balanced. However, since  > 0, in this case the optimal deviation upward must involve
un-balanced consumption (in an optimal deviation user consumes more of each application
that other users consume and less of each applications that she alone consumes), i.e., y <
X
Qk(Qk   QI). Therefore, if Qk > QI, then
 
QI

X   y
QI
 1
R
+ (Qk   QI)

y
Qk   QI
 1
R
!R
  pQk <
 
Qk

X
Qk
 1
R
!R
  pQk :
Recall that QI maximizes the net utility under pure indirect network eects. Therefore, for
Qk > QI,  
Qk

X
Qk
 1
R
!R
  pQk <
 
QI

X
QI
 1
R
!R
  pQI :
Moreover, for any y > 0,

X(X   y)
QI
(N   1) < 
X2
QI
(N   1):
Therefore, any positive deviation, y > 0, toward consuming more applications, Qk > QI, yields
strictly worse net utility for user k,
UDI(Qk > QIjy) <
 
QI

X
QI
 1
R
!R
+ 
X(X   y)
QI
(N   1)   pQI <
<
 
QI

X
QI
 1
R
!R
+ 
X2
QI
(N   1)   pQI = UDI(QI):
39Therefore, any set of applications QI with cardinality QI constitutes a balanced equilibrium.
Suppose that b Q > 1. By Lemma 4, for any Q such that b Q < Q < QI, no user has a
protable deviation downward. Any such Q constitutes a balanced equilibrium if there is also
no protable deviation upward.
For Q such that b Q < Q < QI, suppose that all other users consume Q applications, while
user k consider diverting y of her time toward more applications, Qk > Q. Let UDI(Qk > Qjy >
0) be utility at this deviation and denote the protability of the deviation by
DevProf(Q) = max
y>0;Qk>0
UDI(Qk > Qjy > 0)   V (Q):
From Proposition 1, we know that DevProf( b Q) > 0. We can also show that DevProf(QI) <
0. This follows from the fact that an innitisimal upward deviation from QI under pure indirect
eects yields 0 prot. Due to the loss of the consumption complementarity, under both indirect
and direct network eects the optimal deviation yields smaller utility. Therefore, the deviation
is not protable. Function DevProf(Q) is continuous in Q. Therefore, there must exist Q0,
b Q < Q0 < QI such that DevProf(Q0) = 0. If there are multiple Q satisfying this condition,
let Q0 be the largest. Then, for all Q 2 [Q0;QI], DevProf(Q)  0, i.e., there is no protable
deviation from Q. Hence, all Q 2 [Q0;QI] constitute balanced equilibria.
Proof of Lemma 6 (page 19). Suppose that QI > 1. When all users consume one application
only, their consumption utility is u(Q=1) = X+X2(N 1): Now, if a user deviates to consume
y of second application, her consumption utility is:
u(Q=2) =

(X   y)
1
R + y
1
R
R
+ X(N   1)(X   y):
The optimal level of deviation y is characterized by the rst order condition:
@u(Q=2)
@y
=

(X   y)
1
R + y
1
R
R 1
 
1
y
1  1
R
 

1
X   y
1  1
R
!
  X(N   1) = 0:
Notice that y decreases with N and y ! 0 as N ! 1.
To nd out if the value of the optimal deviation is larger than the price of the second
application, we compute:
u(Q=2jy=y)   u(Q=1) =
=

(X   y)
1
R + y
1
R
R
+ X(N   1)(X   y)   (X + X2(N   1)) <
<

(X   y)
1
R + y
1
R
R
  X:
40Note that ((X   y)
1
R + y
1
R)R X is continuous, takes value zero at y = 0 and it is strictly
increasing in y. Therefore for any price p, we can nd N large enough so that y is low enough
so that u(Q=2jy=y)   u(Q=1) < p, and the deviation is not protable.
Proof of Proposition 2 (page 20). Directly from Lemma 5 we obtain the existence of
multiple equilibria with dierent values of QDI.
The result that the equilibria with a smaller QDI yield higher utility follows directly from
the shape of V (Q) and Lemma 3: All possible equilibria need to be included in the interval
[1;Q?) [ ( b Q;QI]. (The set of equilibria is a strict subset of this interval). The utility obtained
by every user in each equilibrium Q is V (Q). Since V (Q) is strictly increasing on the interval
[1;Q?) [ ( b Q;QI], a lower equilibrium Q yields higher utility for every user than a higher equi-
librium Q.
Proof of Proposition 3 (page 21). The shape of V implies that either Q = 1 or Q = b Q.
First, suppose that Q = b Q > 1. Then, Q? (as dened for Lemma 3) does not exist.
Therefore, by Lemma 3, no Q < b Q may constitute a balanced equilibrium. As in the proof of
Lemma 3, users are better o deviating upward to consuming b Q applications. When A > b Q,
then b Q is not a balanced equilibrium, by Proposition 1. This is because there exists protable
deviation upward, toward consuming larger number of applications. However, when A = Q =
b Q, such deviation is not possible. Therefore, consuming all b Q constitutes the only equilibrium.
Now, suppose that Q = 1. When platform sets A = Q = 1 then trivially, in the only
equilibrium all users consume the only application in the market.
Proof of Proposition 4 (page 24). Suppose that user k consumes Gk applications in a
no-foresight environment. For any given number of applications, Gk, the optimal consumption
schedule is a balanced consumption. This is because for any application, the expected level of
consumption by other users is the same: (N   1)X
A. User k's expected net utility is then
EUDI(Gk) =

Gk
R 1
X + (N   1)
X2
A
  pGk :
Note that the benet from the direct network eect does not depend on Gk. This leads to a
result similar to the one in Remark 2: The above function UDI is maximized by Gk = qI =
 (R 1)X
p
 1
2 R, for any k.
Since QI > 1,36 when A  QI =
 (R 1)X
p
 1
2 R, the expected net utility of a user in equilib-
36When QI = 1, the expected net utility of any user in equilibrium for A  1 is EU
DI(QI = 1) =
X + (N   1)X
2
A   p, which is maximized by A = 1. By Lemma 7, b Q = 1 when QI = 1. Thus, the
unique maximum of V (Q) is always Q = 1. In result, the platform maximizes user's net utility when
41rium, EU
DI(QIjA  QI), is maximized for A = QI.
Since EUDI(Gk) strictly increases in Gk for Gk < QI, every user consumes all applications if
there are fewer applications available than QI. Thus, for A  QI =
 (R 1)X
p
 1
2 R, the expected
net utility of a user in equilibrium is EU
DI(AjA  QI) = (A)
R 1 X + (N   1)X2
A   pA.
Note that this function of A is the same as V (with the exception that V is a function of Q).
Moreover, since QI > 1, it must be that Q < QI. Because Q is the value that maximizes V ,
then A = Q < QI also maximizes the expected net utility EU
DI(AjA  QI). Moreover,
notice that EU
DI(QIjA  QI) is maximized at A = QI, but EU
DI(Q) > EU
DI(QI). So,
A = Q maximizes the expected utility EU
DI on the whole range A  1.
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